


















Philosophy, Art and Critique: A (short) Conversation 




The article sketches a nexus between philosophy, art (poetry) and 
critique with a particular emphasis on the contribution of classical 
Muslim philosophers. At the same time, it demonstrates how luminaries 
such as Omar Khayyam and Ibn Sina, contributed to the renewal of 
philosophy as a freedom seeking exercise and as a means to pursue 
happiness through knowledge. In the second part of the article this 
discussion is geographically de-located to include critical theories from 
mainland Europe. The conclusion focuses on the comparability of these 
contemporary critical theories with the philosophies of the “east”.  
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Philosophy, Art and Critique: A (short) conversation 







Art and philosophy have a common effect on the human mind: They 
detach the subject from “reality” and hijack him into another realm.1 
Philosophy and art are “theories” of what is possible. In this way they 
suggest a libertarian impulse. They simulate another world to which the 
individual could escape. They are intoxicating because they always also 
chime with our romantic and utopian yearnings, at least when philosophy 
and art are forcefully freed from the shackles of conformity. There is a 
second factor that makes philosophy and art comparable. Both human 
pursuits are located in historical contingent constellations that defy 
simple definitions. Of course there have been efforts to “define” 
philosophy and art, but their trajectories escape artificial encampment. As 
such, philosophy and art do not have an origin. There is no text or object 
that could be consolidated as foundational despite stringent efforts in the 
western canon to that end. But even Eurocentric depictions which claim 
                                                 
1. A version of this article was commissioned by Kimiya-ye Honar Magazine in Tehran. 
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philosophy and art for the “west” have failed to mute the critical promise 
that many artists and philosophers believe in. The emergence of 
cosmopolitan theories of art, comparative philosophies and global 
thought are contemporary scholarly manifestations of this rather more 
inclusive trend. Hence, the systematic effort to reduce the history of art 
and philosophy to the “west” and to gentrify its genealogy from the 
impact of the “other” has failed, exactly because art and philosophy have 
to escape the mould of (western) “art” and “philosophy” in order to exist. 
Whenever a limit is defined for artists and philosophers, it is immediately  
My rather abstract introductory suggestions will become clearer and 
more specific in the next paragraphs when I will explore the nexus of art, 
philosophy and critique with insights that are taken from several cultural 
loci. This is to show that the freedom that art and philosophy simulate 
and call for is a universal sentiment and not merely “western”. Every 
philosophy and artwork is an interregnum, a suspension and an 
interruption and interference in the humdrum affairs of society. This is 
why they elicit responses, for instance emotions such as happiness, anger 
or repulsion. In this way art and philosophy continue to entice despite of 
the vulgar commodification of the university and the art-world. 2 Once art 
and philosophy seize to provoke, they seize to exist as human activities. 
We have not reached this point yet. Today, the western “self” and the 
“other” are engaged in a dialectic, which is productive and which creates 
novel forms of critique and negation. This dialectic has thrown a lifeline 
to the making of art and philosophy. It is in this constructive interaction 
that art and philosophy find their true calling and hybrid “identity”. 
      
God and critique 
Art and philosophy as critique can be adequately explained by 
focusing on the way classical Muslim philosophers dealt with contentious 
subjects such as religion and God. The confines of this article do not 
allow me to give a full account of these issues of course. But I hope to 
sketch a forward looking modality in classical Islamic philosophy which 
I think inherently critical and inclusive. In the philosophy of polymaths 
such as Abu Nasr Farabi and Ibn Sina and in their poetry, life takes on a 
forward-looking modality adequate to this idea of the capacity for change 
which is always the pre-requisite for any critical theory and practice. 
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possibility, an optimistic call for the betterment of human existence. In 
that vein, in his uyun al-hikmah Ibn Sina writes that al-hikmah, (which he 
uses as being the same as philosophy) is the perfection of the human soul 
through conceptualisation [tasawwur] of things and judgment [tasdiq] of 
theoretical and practical realities to the measure of human ability.’ 3 
Learned individuals are encouraged to follow a path of finding this 
supreme knowledge, not at least in order to transcend the humdrum 
affairs of their everyday reality and to attain a higher form of contentment 
or happiness.  
Ibn Sina went on in his later writings to distinguish between 
Peripatetic philosophy and what he called ‘Oriental philosophy’ (al-
hikmat al-mashriqi’yah) which was not based on ratiocination alone, but 
included revealed knowledge (it also set the stage for the influential 
treatises of Sohravardi, and here especially his kitab hikmat al-ishraq). 
There is a particularly striking poem by Ibn Sina about the fate of the 
human soul, which exemplifies this emphasis on congruence between 
rational analysis and metaphysical opportunity which was central to the 
canons of the classical philosophers of Islam: 
 
Until when the hour of its homeward flight draws near, 
And ‘tis time for it to return to its ampler sphere, It carols 
with joy, for the veil is raised, and it spies Such things as 
cannot be witnessed by waking eyes. On a lofty height 
doth it warble its songs of praise  (for even the lowliest 
being doth knowledge raise). And so it returneth, aware 
of all hidden things In the universe, while no stain to its 
garment clings. 4 
 
The ultimate object here is the perfection of the intellectual faculties of 
the individual, who does not carry an exclusive identity, who is only 
presumed in his or her physical constitution. There is no realm of 
knowledge that is exclusive to Muslims in the writings of Ibn Sina, no 
discernible schematic dichotomy that permeates his narratives. Ibn Sina 
searches for a supreme truth, not a supreme civilisation or race. He and 
many of his contemporaries managed to write their poetry and 
philosophy without the emergence of a discourse that would legitimate 
subjugation of the “other”, without a hysterical call for arms. In this sense 
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called for freedom of thought through the pursuit of knowledge, 
primarily in the form of philosophy.   
It has been established in the scholarly literature on the subject matter 
that all of this happened in close dialogue with the Aristotelian tradition 
and ancient Greek philosophy in general. Classical philosophers of Islam 
(falasifa) such as Ibn Sina, Ibn Arabi, al-Kindi, Ibn Rushd, Farabi, and 
others employed complex methods explaining how ‘truth conditions’ can 
be rationalised through the study of language, judgement, nature, 
syllogisms, deductions and inductions. Falsafa (philosophy) was 
considered to lead to the knowledge of all existing things qua existent 
(ashya' al-maujudah bi ma hiya maujudah) and philosophy itself was 
deemed to be the art (sind’ah) of arts and the science (ilm) of sciences. 
What came surreptitiously into existence in the writings of these 
philosophers, in short, was nothing less than the renewal of philosophy as 
a critical practice, world-view and form of life.  
All of the classical philosophers of Islam under scrutiny here were 
polymaths, both poets and scientists, engaged in theology and mysticism, 
interested in philosophy and “metaphysics” as much as in the empirical 
worlds. Yet despite their wide-ranging studies they did not advance a 
concrete concept of “identity” that could signify a monologue within the 
umma or that would organise Muslims within a militant, coherently 
formulated ideology. Theirs was an emancipative philosophy almost 
entirely depleted of identity politics or a concrete and dichotomous 
notion of self and other. The historical circumstances they were writing 
in, the presence of functioning Islamic polities, the absence of a direct 
threat to their ‘Muslim identity’, did not merit, or require them to write in 
a stridently ideological mode. The violence exercised over the Islamic 
worlds during the colonial period changed all that.       
I have suggested that for the classical philosophers, in many ways up 
until Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), reality is not exhausted by explaining 
what offers itself to immediate knowledge and perception. The 
understanding of the surrounding world must also include an aspect of 
future potentiality, a utopia wherein the discrepancy between the present 
and the future opens up. This is why in the philosophy of Farabi and 
especially in Ibn Sina’s intricate danish-namaha-ye alai (Treatise on 
Knowledge) philosophy takes on a forward-looking modality adequate to 
this idea of the capacity for change as indicated. In the words of Ibn Sina: 
the contingent existent (mumkin al-wujud) is always relative to the 
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to criticise the present in order to bridge the gap between the ontology 
surrounding the individual and the transcendental promise which is 
relegated to God, without, however, forcing a total causality upon this 
process. The world Ibn Sina sees is secular exactly because God is 
conceptualised to another realm of human existence.   
The world of the philosopher and poet Omar Khayyam (1048-1123) is 
a good place to unravel further the contribution of the idea of God to 
critical art and philosophy and to invite him to contribute to a global 
understanding of their “identity”. The world-view of Khayyam can be 
called “critical” because of the libertarian momentum that his concept of 
God elicits. To his mind, God was the necessary being or mumtani al-
wujud in Arabic (Ibn Sina termed God wajib al-wujud as indicated). By 
necessity human beings were relative to this other-worldly constant. In 
the world portrayed in the poetry of Khayyam, there is freedom because 
in relation to God, reality is socially engineered. In the absence of the 
godly ordained, perfected order, we are at liberty to live our lives in 
pursuit of happiness. For Khayyam the necessary being, that is God, 
continuously entices the relative being, that is the individual in his/her 
pursuit of such perfection. In Khayyam’s world there is doubt exactly 
because in relation to God, this world we are living in is disorderly, 
intransigently complex and not comprehensible in its entirety. ‘Whenever 
it is said that such and such an attribute has a necessary existence in such 
and such a thing,’ Khayyam writes, ‘what is meant is that it exists in the 
mind and the intellect, and not in reality. Similarly whenever it is said 
that the existence of such and such an attribute is dependent upon the 
existence of some other attribute, what is meant is existence in mind and 
the intellect.’6 Khayyam reveals himself here as an early ‘postmodernist’. 
He is convinced that our surrounding world is constructed because the 
realm of actual reality belongs to God. In other words, in his philosophy 
Khayyam alerts us to the fact that relative to God, the self-concocted 
world surrounding us appears ‘unreal’. Khayyam expresses the 
momentum thus ensued, the critical effect that the unavailability of Godly 
reality created in him, in his world famous quatrains: 
 
Since neither truth nor certitude is at hand 
Do not waste life in doubt for a fairy land 
O let us not refuse the goblet of wine  
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Khayyam’s quatrains and philosophy serves as a measure of what 
poetry and art might yet bring about in this irresistibly critical mode. 
Khayyam expresses his alien reality, thus giving the lie to notions of 
religion (including Islam) as a total system immune from the grim 
realities of historical events. In his own words: 
 
Eternity! – for it we find no key; 
Nor any of us past the Veil can see. 
Of Thee and me they talk behind the Veil 
But when that parts, no more of Thee and me. 8 
    
The very failure of Khayyam to redeem himself, the fact that neither 
his poetry nor his ‘drunkenness’ can bring him closer to God, is also, 
paradoxically, the source of the irresistible critical merit of his poetry and 
philosophy. Khayyam presages that the individual is constantly obliged 
to bridge the gap between this alien world and the necessary and absolute 
Divinity designated as God. Yet this utopia is by definition unattainable, 
sameness with God is the ‘impossible ontology’ or mumtani al-wujud in 
Ibn Sina’s words. In this way, Khayyam and the Avicennian tradition 
establishes ‘an ontology based on the “poverty” of all things before God 
and their reliance upon the Source of all being for their very existence’. 9 
Mysticism (Sufism), poetry, the arts and philosophy become the 
inevitable routes to seek respite from the mundane world and to simulate 
closeness with God. They hold out the promise, never to be kept, of a 
realm of consciousness where the individual could at last find an image 
of perfect equilibrium, of sensuous pleasure that would rescue her from 
the antinomies of her present existence. As such, philosophy and poetry 
embody a much perfected form of ontological negation. The idea of God 
functions as a propeller for a productive form of criticism and as an 
incubator for progressive expressions of art and philosophy.  
      
Embraces of self and other 
Let me expand this discussion now and relocate it at the same time. To 
my mind the music of Wagner, Bach and Beethoven’s late style express 
the same power of negation, the ethos of a sensuous escape from the 
ontological order, that the radically transcendental philosophy (and 
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even go one step further, following Adorno. In the aesthetic expression of 
utopia the construction of dichotomous identities, whether of Orient and 
Occident, is minimised, because works of art with maximal aesthetic 
value are depleted of ‘tribal identities’. This is why Rumi, Hafiz, 
Khayyam, Bach, Wagner, Beethoven are almost universally revered. 
Their art positions itself beyond categories. They give us a glimpse into 
the ‘Naturschöne’, the naturally sublime, a sign of reconciliation between 
self and other. 10  
The German Marxist thinker Ernst Bloch expresses a similar belief in 
aesthetic reconciliation especially with regard to the mediating power of 
music. ‘Only the musical note, that enigma of sensuousness,’ he writes, 
‘is sufficiently unencumbered by the world yet phenomenal enough to 
the last to return — like the metaphysical word — as a final material 
factor in the fulfilment of mystical self-perception, spread upon the 
golden sub-soil of the receptive human potentiality.’11 Bloch alludes to 
the dual constitution of music, which has both formal properties and 
transcendental ones. In this he concurs with other German thinkers such 
as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche who coined the term ‘musical ecstasy’ in 
his The Birth of Tragedy. They all agree that music is ‘at once the most 
humanly revealing form of art and the form most resistant to description 
or analysis in conceptual terms.’12 From this perspective, music both 
rationalises and mystifies, it has both mathematical structure and 
emotional power. If musical aesthetics could hitherto not negotiate 
between these two extremes, it is an indicator that music brings both to 
the fore, without reconciling them in a final, grand synthesis. There is no 
transcendence or unity, for what music potentially presages is a ‘figuring-
out in fonte hominum et rerum that is utopian and fermenting, in an area 
of intensity that is open only to music.’13 For Bloch, especially 
Beethoven’s compositions are anti-Hegelian, even contra-Enlightenment 
because they do not mimic perfect harmony. Beethoven may touch and 
tease the irreconcilable, but he finally keeps them apart. In this, music is 
the most successful of the arts ‘succeeding visuality and belonging to the 
formally eccentric philosophy of inwardness, its ethic and metaphysics’. 
For Bloch this means that ‘[b]oth the existence and the concept of music 
are only attained in conjunction with a new object-theory, with the 
metaphysics of divination and utopia.’14 Thus the transformative force of 
music lies in its unreconciled vigour which defies capitulation to 
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Art expressed in this form is ‘trans-historical’ without prescribing 
tribal passions. I get emotionally aroused when I listen to Wagner, so 
did Hitler. The pop singer ‘Madonna’ is fascinated by the poetry of 
Rumi, so was Ayatollah Khomeini. It is in this sense that art embodies 
the potentiality of change without, however, falling into the trap of 
Hegel’s big promise that it can bring about the final reconciliation of 
opposites, the great myth of perfect harmony. This is art as continuous 
renewal that does not usher in a grand synthesis. For Adorno there is  
 
more pleasure in dissonance than in consonance: and this 
repays hedonism in due measure. What is incisive is 
dynamically sharpened, differentiated from itself and from 
the monotony of affirmativeness, and becomes an attraction. 
This attraction, no less than a disgust with optimistic 
nonsense, leads the new art into a no-man’s-land that 
represents the inhabitable earth. … Negation is able to 
transform itself into pleasure, not into what is positive.15   
 
Once it is realised that the contrapuntal composition of art is not 
reconcilable, the Hegelian promise reveals itself as a fallacy. Here we can 
establish a nuance between Bloch and Adorno. Whereas the former 
professed in the ability of music to effectively respond to emergent social 
and historical configurations, the latter’s negative dialectic is notably 
more pessimistic. For Adorno, the ‘promise held out by the work of art 
that it will create truth by lending new shape to the conventional social 
forms is as necessary as it is hypocritical.’ It is necessary because art 
unleashes irresistible transcendental powers:  
 
That factor in a work of art which enables it to transcend 
reality certainly cannot be detached from style; but it does 
not consist of the harmony actually realised, of any 
doubtful unity of form and content, within and without, of 
individual and society; it is to be found in those features 
in which discrepancy appears: in the necessary failure of 
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And it is hypocritical because with the advent of the modern ‘culture 
industry’ the emancipatory and redeeming forces of art are subjugated to 
the cult of consumption (e.g. pop shows such as the ‘X Factor’ or 
‘American Idol’). Instead of exposing itself to the intrinsic resistance of 
art to loose the power of negation and critique, the culture industry 
pushes art towards conformity with the status quo; art as commodity and 
‘obedience to social hierarchy. ‘Today,’ Adorno writes, ‘aesthetic 
barbarity completes what has threatened the creations of the spirit since 
they were gathered together as culture and neutralised.’17 The only way 
the critical theorists could escape this conundrum, is to free himself from 
the determinations of his day and age, to seek the powers of negation, if 
necessary in music and literature (Becket in Adorno’s case). It is true, 
that Adorno famously concluded that writing poetry after Auschwitz is 
barbaric. But this does not mean that he advocated cultural, political and 
social apathy. Like Khayyam, who tampered his despair by positioning 
himself within the realm of Islamic mysticism (if necessary by drinking a 
few carafes of wine), Adorno identified radical negation as the only means 
to prepare ourselves for the massive process of ‘final displacement’ that 
will be brought about by the messianic utopia awaiting him: 
 
The only philosophy which can be responsibly practised in the 
face of despair is the attempt to contemplate all things as they 
would appear from the standpoint of redemption … 
Perspectives must be fashioned that displace and estrange the 
world, reveal it to be, with its rifts and crevices, as indigent 
and distorted as it will appear one day in the messianic light.18 
 
Critical theory reveals itself here as a prophylaxis to prepare humanity 
for the experience of the absolute realm of possibility, mumtani al-wujud, 
encapsulated in the ‘suridealistic’ encounter with God. According to 
Adorno, this final encounter will evaporate all residues of our 
superstitious belief in an ‘orderly’ world. As long as the poet, composer, 
artist, mystic, philosopher and intellectual do not despair in their effort to 
bridge the gap between the status quo and that utopia, they are compelled 
to search for the ‘truth’ which engenders a critical attitude towards the 
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their mind, it does not if it is History or God which constitutes the 
horizon, the place towards which all meaning strife in the quest for the 
‘ultimate surideal’, the ‘end of history’ or ‘judgment day’. It does not 
matter if it is the dialectical materialism of Marx or Jesus’s ‘Kingdom of 
God’, the Buddhist Nirvana or the Hindu Karma, that animates critique. 
It only does, when the continuous transformation towards a future 
potentiality is monopolised by the state, the party or another polity or 
when values such as equality, social justice and human rights are 
compromised. It does not really matter which utopia inspires us, as long 
as it compels us to sustain a global impetus against reification, against 
quests for authenticity, against hegemony, against totalities, against the 
deification of power. As long as utopia holds out the promise of continuous 
transformation towards a better tomorrow, where the relation between 
knower and known is a dialectic potentially open for contrapuntal re-
imagining, it is not something that we should be afraid of.19  
It was Immanuel Kant who asked whether one should leave the 
comforting bosom of one’s own rationality and venture out to discover 
the ‘other’. After some serious critical contemplation he remained where 
he departed from. Others did dare to venture further. Some of them paid a 
heavy price—delusion and insanity in Nietzsche’s case, melancholy and 
despair in the case of Khayyam. Optimistically, I do believe—and in my 
rather more recent writing have tried to demonstrate—that today we can 
appreciate the archives filled with the work of eastern and western, 
northern and southern thinkers in a truly comparative manner. It is not at 
least thanks to the availability of a counter-archive to Eurocentric 
readings of philosophy and art, that we have enough knowledge at hand 
to free ourselves from the shackles of tribal thinking. So that the next 
time we read a history of the ‘west’ or ‘Islam’, we immediately ask how 
the ‘other’ is represented; if she is not abused as a supplement in order to 
enunciate what the ‘self’ stands for. Next time we attend a seminar or 
lecture, we would pierce the speaker with questions about the validity of 
categories such as race, nationality, religious confession etc. We would 
ask her if it is analytically unproblematic to place ourselves inside such 
suspicious totalisations.   
No discourse is innocent, nothing in the social world is apolitical and I 
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are dubious. Freeing oneself from their totalitarian impact is utterly 
rewarding. Mind you, it does shatter the infinitesimally small mosaics out 
of which we have created our identities. But once we pull our self 
together and start the process of picking up the pieces, they will appear 
clearer to us; we will be able to analyse and comprehend them more 
easily and to reconfigure them within a wider frame than before. And so 
it is that we can attain to a multicultural consciousness without 
committing any pagan betrayal of our own Mosaic composition. At that 
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